The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests (“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause”), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing thatthere is one). I am particularly concerned with (...) the problems that arise when it is assumed (as it often is) that that the First Cause is timeless and that it timelessly creates time. I argue that this forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the concept of “beginning to exist” in a way that raises series doubts about its main causal principle, and that it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe must be a person. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests (“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause”), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing thatthere is one). I am particularly concerned with (...) the problems that arise when it is assumed (as it often is) that that the First Cause is timeless and that it timelessly creates time. I argue that this forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the concept of “beginning to exist” in a way that raises series doubts about its main causal principle, and that it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe must be a person. (shrink)

In defense of his claim that the universe must have been created, William Lane Craig gives two distinct philosophical arguments against the possibility of an infinite past. The first appeals to various paradoxes allegedly generated by the idea of an actual infinite. The second appeals to a dynamic theory of the nature of time, and tries to show on that basis that an infinite series of events could not have been “formed by successive addition.” The present paper (...) is concerned with the second of these two arguments. I try to show that it cannot stand on its own independently of the first argument, that Craig does not succeed in defending it against standard objections, and that even those who are inclined to accept a dynamic theory of time should not be convinced by what Craig says in its defense. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to an influential line of argument, the past must be finite because no infinite series can be formed by successive addition. The present paper pinpoints the non sequitur at the heart of this argument, disentangles the ambiguities that disguise it, and dismantles the misleading picture of ‘traversing the infinite’ that gives the argument so much of its allure. Finally, the paper critically explores the related argument that a beginningless series of past events is impossible because there could (...) be no explanation of its having been ‘completed’ at one time rather than another. (shrink)

One of the principal lines of argument deployed by the friends of the kalām cosmological argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events is a quite general argument against the possibility of an actual infinite. The principal thesis of the present paper is that if this argument worked as advertised, parallel considerations would force us to conclude, not merely that a series of discrete, successive events must have a first member, but also that such a series (...) must have a final member. Anyone who thinks that an endless series of events is possible must therefore reject this popular line of argument against the possibility of an actual infinite. (shrink)

: Those who are morally opposed to abortion generally make several pivotal assumptions. This paper focuses on the assumption that we have full moral status throughout our existence. Coupled with the assumption that we come into existence at conception, the assumption about moral status entails that all human fetuses have full moral status, including a right to life. Is the assumption about moral status correct? In addressing this question, I respond to several arguments advanced, in this journal and (...) other venues, by Alfonso Gómez-Lobo. Gómez-Lobo's reasoning resolves into two basic arguments: (1) an appeal to the practical necessity of early moral protection and (2) an appeal to our kind membership and potentiality. I respond to these in turn before offering further reflections. (shrink)

Sober develops an account of adaptations on which they must have been positive causal factors for reproductive success. Glymour defends an account of a proper subset of adaptations—adaptations to particular environmental conditions—on which traits must interact in a special way with adapting conditions to cause reproductive success. These theories render conflicting judgments about which traits count as adaptations in some interesting cases. In this article I explore one such case and argue that we ought to replace the (...) notion of adaptation qua positive causal factor with a novel notion of adaptation. (shrink)

It is often said that time must have a beginning because otherwise the series of past events would have the paradoxical features of an actual infinite. In the present paper, we show that, even given a dynamic theory of time, the cardinality of an endless series of events, each of which will occur, is the same as that of a beginningless series of events, each of which has occurred. Both are denumerably infinite. So if an endless series (...) of events is possible, then the possibility of a beginningless series of past events should not be rejected merely on the ground that it would be an actual infinite. What would be required to rebut our argument is a symmetry breaker – something that motivates treating the past relevantly differently to the future. We consider several attempts to provide a symmetry breaker and show that none of them is successful. (shrink)

Based on Maldonado-Torres’s formulation of the term, we conceive the decolonial turn as a form of liberating and decolonising reason beyond the liberal and Enlightened emancipation of rationality, and beyond the more radical Euro-critiques that have failed to consistently challenge the legacies of Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity (often Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism). We complement Maldonado-Torres’s account of the decolonial turn in philosophy, theory and critique by providing an analysis of the trajectories of academic philosophy and clarifying the relevance (...) of decolonising philosophy and of the decolonial turn for current efforts in transforming philosophy in face of the challenges of social movements such as the Third World Liberation Front and Black Lives Matter in the United States, and Rhodes Must Fall in South Africa and England. After a brief analysis of the trajectory and current status of philosophy as a discipline in the modern Western research university, we provide examples of the decolonial turn and of decolonising philosophy in three areas: the engagement with (1) Asian and (2) Latin American philosophies, and (3) debates in the philosophy of race and gender. (shrink)

Must we vote for the common good? This isn’t an easy question to answer, in part because there is so little literature on the ethics of voting and, such as there is, it tends to assume without argument that we must vote for the common good. Indeed, contemporary political philosophers appear to agree that we should vote for the common good even when they disagree about seemingly related matters, such as whether we should be legally required to vote, (...) whether we are entitled to vote secretly rather than openly, or what form of democracy is most morally desirable.1 Such agreement is puzzling, then, given the extensive disagreements that surround it. Hence, the aim of this paper is to consider whether the only morally correct way to vote is to vote for the common good. My hope is that even those who are not persuaded by the answers that I can offer at the moment, will find that the question is less easy to answer than they may have thought, and that the ethics of voting merits more sustained attention than it has received thus far. (shrink)

Must we always pursue economic growth? Kogelmann answers yes. Not only should poor countries pursue growth, but rich countries should as well. Kogelmann aims to provide a wealth-insensitive argument – one demonstrating all countries should pursue growth regardless of their wealth. His central argument – the no halting growth (NHG) argument – says no country experiencing growth should stop it, because doing so requires undermining the conditions causing it and those conditions are independently morally desirable, so they should not (...) be undermined. For countries not growing, he may argue that they have an obligation to implement the conditions that cause growth because they are independently morally desirable. Call this the implementation argument. I contend that neither argument is wealth-insensitive as each fails to establish an obligation to pursue growth. I attempt to diagnose how this could be and propose that it is a product of attempting to answer three questions about growth simultaneously. (shrink)

For well over 20 years I have been arguing that someday we will have to ration health care for the elderly. I got started in the mid-1980s when I served on an Office of Technology Assessment panel to assess the likely impact on elderly health care costs of emergent, increasingly expensive medical technologies. They would, the panel concluded, raise some serious problems for the future of Medicare. The panel did not take up what might be done about those (...) costs, but I decided to think about that question and wrote a book called, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society. (shrink)

It is widely held that for an agent to have any intellectual character virtues, they must be fundamentally motivated by a love of epistemic goods. In this paper, I challenge this ‘strong motivational requirement’ on virtue. First, I call into question three key reasons offered in its defence: that a love of epistemic goods is needed to explain the scope, the performance quality, or the value of virtue. Secondly, I highlight several costs and restrictions that we incur from (...) its acceptance. In so doing, I show that my titular question is more than just a question about the nature of virtuous motivation or the structure of intellectual virtue. Ultimately, it is a question about the very function of virtue epistemology itself. (shrink)

The notion of virtue in general, and courage in particular, has had a hard time integrating itself into the everyday lexicon of bioethics. Following the lead of enlightenment moral philosophy, which concentrates on the theory of right action as opposed to the ancient Greeks' emphasis on the development of good character, bioethics, with some notable exceptions, has tended to relegate consideration of the virtues to the sidelines of moral argument. Recently, however, there have been calls for the necessity of (...) “moral courage” in the context of clinical ethics. As nurses, physicians, and other health care professionals confront a variety of moral contexts in which the virtue of courage is invoked to "do the right thing," stand up for patients' rights, and uphold the ethical standards of their professions, they are increasingly reminded of their moral duty to exhibit courage in the face of institutional obstacles to the proper care of their patients. For example, a nurse's hesitation to approach a physician to request increased sedation for an agitated patient out of fear of retaliation is represented in one article as a lack of courage.In this paper we offer a critical assessment of such invocations of courage. While we find courage to be an indispensable virtue in some challenging contexts, in other settings we find invocations of courage to be both an unfortunate endorsement of an oppressive status quo that can divert attention from the real problems and an undesirable and potentially destructive strategy within health care institutions whose goal is medically excellent and morally good clinical practice. As we shall argue, a call to virtuousness is not always virtuous. (shrink)

Must We Mean What We Play? INTRODUCTION It was Sir Thomas Beecham who said,'The English do not care for music-but they love the noise it makes.'Sir Thomas was, of course, given to making acerbic swipes but this one has always seemed to me to have.

It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

Investment protection clauses, and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms they enable, have become a common feature of international agreements on trade and investment. Intended to promote foreign investment, these protections may also discourage governments from regulating in the public interest. This raises challenging normative questions about the rights of investors and distributive justice. In this paper, I argue that a global investment regime that disadvantages developing countries and socially disadvantaged groups is prima facie unfair. This conclusion must be (...) defended against the claim that investors have certain independent moral rights to have their property protected, regardless of the distributive consequences. Granting the premise that such investor rights exist, I argue that these cannot plausibly ground a general rule against public interest regulation that undermines the value of property. I conclude that even if foreign investors have rights that must be safeguarded, the current investment regime must be reformed. (shrink)

The Marquis de Sade has been labeled everything from a sadomasochistic pornographer to the fiction writer responsible for the ideas that led to the Nazi death camps. Must We Burn Sade? peels away the negative legacy that has shrouded Sade for too long. Deepak Narang Sawhney points out that "Sade's legacy has been neglected, recreated, fictionalized, and venerated by medical guilds, literary hacks, religious detractors, and intellectual movements. In the past two centuries, Sade has come to represent many things (...) for many people.... It is unclear whether we know Sade the writer or the apparatus which has been set up to either condemn or to sanctify his life and work." By contrast, this intriguing collection of essays seeks to examine Sade for what he was—a writer of novels and letters, a creator of plays and stories, and an author of essays and political manifestos. The contributors examine the literary, theatrical, political, social, and philosophical aspects of Sade's work, acquitting him of the false accusations and trials that have plagued his name by revealing his influences and motivations, and by providing an understanding of society's fear of Sade. What is so alarming about Sade's books that civilized society has felt compelled to disassociate itself from his works? This volume forces us to rethink Sade. Included are essays by Kathy Acker, David Allison, Georges Bataille, Catherine Cusset, Lucienne Frappier-Mazur, Annie Le Brun, Alphonso Lingis, Stephen Pfohl, Deepak Narang Sawhney, Philippe Sollers, and Alistair Welchman. (shrink)

Personal forgiveness, in a worldly setting, is an act performed by a human person to overcome resentment, among others, in order for that person to open up to possibilities of accommodation of, acceptance of, and reconciliation or communion with the Other. I want to argue that such an act is spiritual in nature or has an element of divinity in it. To forgive is to be lovingly compassionate, and the act of being lovingly compassionate in the midst of being wronged (...) or downtrodden, or exploited and so on—real or imagined—is an act that goes beyond being human: it appears knowingly or unknowingly—even for a non-believer—to have the guidance of a spiritual support. One overriding reason, among many, on why we must forgive is to have peace of mind, that is, to overcome the inherent spiritual distress or emotional burden, or both. In this regard, personal forgiveness may be considered as a form of an enlightened self-interest. (shrink)

I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the (...) threat to them from the experimental results. Finally, I will set out my general approach to the data, as well as some specific suggestions about how to think about each set of experiments. I will conclude that philosophers searching for a unified theory need not give up, but that at the same time they can learn a great deal from the new data. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why This Genre, the Autism Novel? A Role for Children's Autism Stories The New Discourse A Caution An Invocation of Lev Vygotsky An Invocation of Wolfgang Köhler Well‐Established Language Incidental Autism The Child Biography Turned into Family Novel The Child Biography Turned into Mystery Story Manga Overdoing the Inner Autism and the Nerd Self‐Discovery (My Son Is a Genius with Computers; I Must Have Some of His Genes) From the Psychiatrist's Point of View (...) The Promise and the Danger References. (shrink)

Many in the discourse on climate engineering agree that if deployment of solar radiation management (SRM) technologies is ever permissible, then it must be accompanied by far-reaching mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This raises the question of if and how both strategies interact. Although raised in many publications, there are surprisingly few detailed investigations of this important issue. The paper aims at contributing to closing this research gap by (i) reconstructing moral hazard claims to clarify their aim, (ii) (...) offering one specific normative justification for far-reaching mitigation and (iii) investigating in greater detail different mechanisms that could potentially cause a trade-off between mitigation and SRM. I conclude that the empirical evidence questioning the trade-off hypothesis is inconclusive. Moreover, theoretical reflections as well as economic model studies point to a trade-off. In our current epistemic situation these findings must be taken seriously. They caution against researching and developing SRM technologies before measures to avoid or minimise a trade-off are implemented. (shrink)

Should we be allowed to refuse any involvement of artificial intelligence technology in diagnosis and treatment planning? This is the relevant question posed by Ploug and Holm in a recent article in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. In this article, I adhere to their conclusions, but not necessarily to the rationale that supports them. First, I argue that the idea that we should recognize this right on the basis of a rational interest defence is not plausible, unless we are willing (...) to judge each patient’s ideology or religion. Instead, I consider that the right must be recognized by virtue of values such as social pluralism or individual autonomy. Second, I point out that the scope of such a right should be limited at least under three circumstances: if it is against a physician’s obligation to not cause unnecessary harm to a patient or to not provide futile treatment, in cases where the costs of implementing this right are too high, or if recognizing the right would deprive other patients of their own rights to adequate health care. (shrink)

This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.

Patients are usually granted autonomy rights, including the right to consent to or refuse treatment. These rights are commonly attributed to patients if they fulfil certain conditions. For example, a patient must sufficiently understand the information given to them before making a treatment decision. On the one hand, there is a large group of patients who meet these conditions. On the other hand, there is a group that clearly does not meet these conditions, including comatose patients or patients in (...) the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Then there is a group of patients who fall into the range in between. At the lower end of this range are so-called ‘marginal agents,’ which include young children and patients in the middle stages of Alzheimer’s disease. They also do not meet the typical requirements for autonomy, which is why they are usually granted fewer autonomy rights. However, some of them are capable of ‘pre-forms’ of autonomy that express what is important to them. These pre-forms differ from mere desires and reflect the identification/authenticity condition of autonomy. They have something in common with autonomous attitudes, choices, and actions – namely, they express the _value_ of autonomy. As I will argue, autonomy is a value worthy of protection and promotion – even in its non-reflexive forms. Against this background, it becomes clear _why_ we have autonomy duties, more precisely positive, autonomy-enabling duties, towards marginal agents and why we should give them as much attention as autonomy duties towards competent patients. (shrink)

Wallace has recently argued that a number of popular approaches to the measurement problem can’t be fully extended to relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory; Wallace thus contends that as things currently stand, only the unitary-only approaches to the measurement problem are viable. However, the unitary-only approaches face serious epistemic problems which may threaten their viability as solutions, and thus we consider that it remains an urgent outstanding problem to find a viable solution to the measurement problem which can (...) be extended to relativistic quantum mechanics. In this article we seek to understand in general terms what such a thing might look like. We argue that in order to avoid serious epistemic problems, the solution must be a single-world realist approach, and we further argue that any single-world realist approach which is able to reproduce the predictions of relativistic quantum mechanics will most likely have the property that our observable reality does not supervene on dynamical, precisely-defined microscopic beables. Thus we suggest three possible routes for further exploration: observable reality could be approximate and emergent, as in relational quantum mechanics with the addition of cross-perspective links, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not microscopically defined, as in the consistent histories approach, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not dynamical, as in Kent’s solution to the Lorentzian classical reality problem. We conclude that once all of these issues are taken into account, the options for a viable solution to the measurement problem are significantly narrowed down. (shrink)

Across three decades in both Britain and the United States, surveys indicate that women must work harder than men do. Using data from the 1997 Skills Survey of the Employed British Workforce and the 1997 National Study of the Changing Workforce, the authors investigate two possible explanations for this gap in reports of required effort: gender differences in job characteristics and family responsibilities. In multivariate ordered logistic regressions, extensive measures of job characteristics do not explain the difference between women (...) and men. Family obligations, as well, account for little or none of the gap. The authors argue that the association between gender and reported required work effort is best interpreted as reflecting stricter performance standards imposed on women, even when women and men hold the same jobs. The authors discuss alternative interpretations and implications for research. (shrink)

A historically responsible agent is willing to be somehow in practical solidarity with all other actors with whom action is shared over time. The responsible idea of a most-inclusive history encompasses future occurrence together with all that has happened already. Despite our lack of control over future developments, we assess possible future ages as bright or dark and position ourselves as contributors to multigenerational endeavors that we hope will be long-term successes in themselves and part of a larger historical optimality. (...) Informed by the evolutionary sciences, a plausible modern envisioning of the future must include evolutionary innovations and surprises on a very long time scale. The historically responsible agent will therefore take seriously efforts like Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men to imagine the new powers and goals of our distantly posthuman future sharers in history. (shrink)

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay (...) is the most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Briefly stated my point is that the well-being of each person in a community conceived abstractly may be all too easily sacrificed for the sake of the abstraction. Physicians may offer critically ill patients places in programs of experimental treatment, but there is commonly a catch to the offer. To take part in a program of clinical experiment a patient must not only risk a possible failure of a fresh drug and the chance of destructive side effects from the (...) drug, but the patients must risk only getting the traditional treatment along with a placebo rather than the experimental drug. Placebo control, double blind critical protocols for testing effects of fresh drugs on critically ill patients are a commonplace. I question the scientific objectivity of the protocols and the underlying ethic, and suggest use of alternate protocols. Experimental tests in the treatment gram-negative bacteria blood infections, muscular dystrophy, and AIDS and AIDS-related diseases are examples. (shrink)

While child language development theory must explain invariant “success,” foreign language learning theory must explain variation and lack of success. The fundamental difference hypothesis (FDH) outlines such a theory. Epstein et al. ignore the explanatory burden, mischaracterize the FDH, and underestimate the resources of human cognition. The field of second language acquisition is not divided into camps by views on “access” to UG.

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is an (...) excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings.. (shrink)

The Doomsday Argument is alive and kicking, and since its formulation in the beginning of the Eighties by the astrophysicist Brandon Carter it has gained wide attention, been strongly criticized and has been described in many different, and sometimes non-interchangeable analogies. I will briefly present the argument here, and departing from Nick Bostrom's interpretation, I will defend that doom may be sooner than we think if we start building conscious machines soon in the future.

Cavell is one of the most gifted and sensitive philosophers who has been influenced by Wittgenstein and Austin. He is no slavish disciple but an intelligent and perceptive interpreter of the contemporary sensibility. Six of the ten essays have already appeared in print and some have already become intellectual gems. In "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Cavell better than most has managed to capture and convey the spirit and the intensity of the later Wittgenstein. The title essay (...) is the most articulate defense of what ordinary language philosophy can be at its best. But Cavell is also an incisive commentator on Beckett and Kierkegaard. He illuminates a range of aesthetic issues. Cavell's forte is that of an essayist who manages to create in each of his essays a "form of life" within which one can participate and share his insight.--R. J. B. (shrink)

As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...) system must also reflect our social need for a working concept of responsibility. (shrink)

Philip Ball brings a cognitive-scientific perspective to the breadth of music theory in his work The Music Instinct. Whether or not music is a universal language, it is a cultural phenomenon found universally in the human population. In the debate as to whether humans evolved this tendency to make music as an essential adaptation or as non-adaptive “spandrel,” Ball maintains that music is crucial to what it means to be human. Without definitively explaining just how humans developed music, delimiting that (...) “instinct” or saying such instinct dictates what kind of music answers to it, he explains how the many different aspects of musical structure—and indeed much music theory, Western or Eastern—may have correlates in cognitive structures. The predominant step and half-step tonal progression in melodies, the role of the octave, underlying rhythm, all such appear to have cognitive explanation. The problem, Ball brings out, is that whatever the cognitive musical structures may be are far from clear. Perhaps many kinds of music do appeal to these cognitive structures, but must all music meet even a certain minimum of them? Based on current cognitive knowledge, cases against modernist Western music are hard to make soundly. (shrink)

Recent ethical literature has called attention to subtle yet profound difficulties in determining what types of generosity are moral, and what situations call for generosity. This article contributes to this discussion by advancing a perspective drawn from Christian theology, according to which philanthropic endeavours must follow a downwards trajectory, modelled on God’s self-donation. Once this model is understood, potentially problematic rhetorical frameworks of generosity—such as that of Anselm of Canterbury—can be identified. This article further argues that the downwards trajectory (...) of generosity has important implications for institutions that use philanthropic rhetoric in their fundraising, as well as for philosophers seeking to establish conditions for ethical generosity. (shrink)

Recent ethical literature has called attention to subtle yet profound difficulties in determining what types of generosity are moral, and what situations call for generosity. This article contributes to this discussion by advancing a perspective drawn from Christian theology, according to which philanthropic endeavours must follow a downwards trajectory, modelled on God’s self-donation. Once this model is understood, potentially problematic rhetorical frameworks of generosity—such as that of Anselm of Canterbury—can be identified. This article further argues that the downwards trajectory (...) of generosity has important implications for institutions that use philanthropic rhetoric in their fundraising, as well as for philosophers seeking to establish conditions for ethical generosity. (shrink)

The ever-increasing technological advances of modern medicine have increased physicians’ capacity to carry out a wide array of clinical interventions near the end-of-life. These new procedures have resulted in new “types” of living where a patient’s cognitive functions are severely diminished although many physiological functions remain active. In this biomedical context, patients, surrogate decision-makers, and clinicians all struggle with decisions about what clinical interventions to pursue and when therapeutic intent should be replaced with palliative goals of care. For (...) some patients and clinicians, religious teachings about the duty to seek medical care and the care of the dying offer ethical guidance when faced with such choices. Accordingly, this paper argues that traditional Sunni Islamic ethico-legal views on the obligation to seek medical care and Islamic theological concepts of human dignity and inviolability provide the ethical grounds for non-intervention at the end-of-life and can help calibrate goals of care discussions for Muslim patients. In closing the paper highlights the pressing need to develop a holistic ethics of healthcare of the dying from an Islamic perspective that brings together multiple genres of the Islamic intellectual tradition so that it can meet the needs of the patients, clinicians and Muslim religious leaders interacting with the healthcare system. (shrink)

Many ethical theorists believe that a given distribution of healthcare is morally justified only if (1) it is cost-effective and (2) it does not discriminate against older adults and disabled people. However, if (3) cost-effectiveness involves maximizing the number of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) added by a given unit of healthcare resource, or cost, it seems the pursuit of cost-effectiveness will inevitably discriminate against older adults and disabled patients. I show why this trilemma is harder to escape than some theorists think. (...) We cannot avoid it by using age- or disability-weighted QALY scores, for example. I then explain why there is no sense of “discrimination” on which discrimination isbothunjust, and thus something healthcare rationing must avoid,andsomething cost-effective healthcare rationing inevitably involves. I go on to argue that many of the reasons we have for not favoring rationing that maximizes QALYs outside the healthcare context apply in healthcare as well. Thus, claim (1) above is dubious. (shrink)

The ever-increasing technological advances of modern medicine have increased physicians’ capacity to carry out a wide array of clinical interventions near the end of life. These new procedures have resulted in new “types” of living where a patient’s cognitive functions are severely diminished although many physiological functions remain active. In this biomedical context, patients, surrogate decision-makers, and clinicians all struggle with decisions about what clinical interventions to pursue and when therapeutic intent should be replaced with palliative goals of (...) care. For some patients and clinicians, religious teachings about the duty to seek medical care and the care of the dying offer ethical guidance when faced with such choices. Accordingly, this paper argues that traditional Sunni Islamic ethico-legal views on the obligation to seek medical care and Islamic theological concepts of human dignity and inviolability provide the ethical grounds for non-intervention at the end of life and can help calibrate goals of care discussions for Muslim patients. In closing, the paper highlights the pressing need to develop a holistic ethics of healthcare of the dying from an Islamic perspective that brings together multiple genres of the Islamic intellectual tradition so that it can meet the needs of the patients, clinicians, and Muslim religious leaders interacting with the healthcare system. (shrink)

This essay examines how C. S. Lewis, in Till We Have Faces, illustrates the Christian’s journey of sanctification through the pre-Christian story of his main character, Orual. She must gain two ‘faces’ in this process that correspond to the two books she writes. First, she must gain the face of self-knowledge through humility. The key components to this face are her memory and the act of writing of her first book, which together create a mirror to reflect (...) her sin back to her. Second, Orual must gain the face of transformation through divine agape love. The humility she learned from her first face now allows her to enter what Lewis describes as the dance of self-giving, which is a crucial element to the second face of transformation in its mortification of Orual’s sin and selfishness. In the second face, Orual gains access to an ‘actual language’ that transcends merely verbal words and involves worshipping the god with her whole being, as do we in being transformed to reflect Christ more clearly. Orual’s writing is a form of this ‘actual language’, and her second book that shares her personal encounter with the god of the mountain reflects to others the beauty of the divine. Similarly, Christians should reflect Jesus with their lives and their art, which are inextricably intertwined because a life lived for Him is the highest form of artwork they can create. (shrink)

Only recently have historians explored in depth the role of the medical profession in Nazi Germany. Several recent works reveal that physicians joined the Nazi party in disproportionate numbers and lent both their efforts and their authority to Nazi eugenic and racist programs. While the crimes of the physician Mengele and a few others are well known, recent research points to a much broader involvement by the profession, even in its everyday clinical work. Analogous activities existed in the German (...) legal and industrial communities; disruption of the medical ethic thus sprang from the broader social contexts of Nazi Germany. The new United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, now opening on the Mall in Washington, D.C, will have an opportunity to educate the public about both the great crimes at Auschwitz and other camps, and the gradual but thorough degradation of ethics in the German medical profession. From this presentation, contemporary bioethics can ponder the proper use of the Nazi analogy in bioethical debate. (shrink)

:Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar’s positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that1)The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings.2)The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.The reason given for (...) the first point is that it is possible to imagine postpersons who are morally enhanced, provided that we consider moral enhancement as an augmented inclination to act in line with how we believe we ought to act. There are two reasons offered for the second point: the first indicates probability, and the second offers proof. That is, if we assume that the higher moral status of postpersons implies their enhanced morality, we can conclude, inductively, that postpersons will not be inclined to annihilate mere persons. For if mere persons have moral inhibitions against obliterating some species of a lower moral status than their own, morally enhanced postpersons will be even less likely to do the same to mere persons. In fact, they might consider it their moral duty to preserve those beings who enabled them to come into existence. Moreover, even if morally enhanced postpersons decide to annihilate mere persons, we can conclude, deductively, that such a decision is by necessity a morally superior stance to the wish of mere persons to continue to exist. (shrink)